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Abstract: The tragic events which occurred during the ‘90s in the Balkans have reiterated the need 
for the European Union (EU) to assume a much more assertive role in managing security concerns in 
Europe, including the development of European defence capabilities. In 1998, at Saint Malo, Tony Blair and 
Jacques  Chirac  launched  the  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (ESDP).  This  project  has  been 
generated due to the EU’s need to adopt a strategic framework within which to develop a global defence and 
security component, as well as due to a growing necessity for the EU to contribute effectively to North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United Nations (UN) efforts of conducting defence, international 
crisis management and peacekeeping operations at an international level in conflict-prone areas. In recent 
years,  ESDP  has  undergone  a  spectacular  evolution,  being  now  among  the  major  issues  discussed  in 
Brussels. However, the creation of the ESDP has been greeted with caution by some NATO members being 
perceived primarily as a threat to the integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The purpose of this 
paper is to examine the difficulties the ESDP has encountered since its inception and also to what extent it 
has affected the EU-NATO and the EU-US nexus. 
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Since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  both  European  and  American  officials  have  sought  to 
rebalance  or  strengthen  NATO  through  the  development  of  a  stronger  European  pillar. 
Subsequently, the replacement of European Political Cooperation by the Common Foreign Security 
Policy under the 1993 Maastricht Treaty of the EU addressed for the first time security and defence 
issues. (White, 2001, p. 94) However, the 1991 Gulf War and the outbreak of Yugoslavian conflict 
emphasised that Europe was still unable to act as an autonomous security entity. “By 1994, NATO 
had risen, Phoenix like, from its own apparent self-immolation and had re-emerged as the only 
show in town.” (Howorth and Keeler, 2003, p. 7) The steps towards limited autonomy took place 
effectively at NATO’s June 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting when, after long debates between the 
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was created as a technical-military means to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance. In this 
sense, ESDI authorised the EU’s forces to take on operations in which NATO did not wish to be 
involved.  In  order  to  back  up  ESDI,  the  Combined  Joint  Task  Forces  (CJTFs)  concept  was 
launched. “CJTFs would facilitate NATO’s new missions in crisis management and peace support 
operations by providing the flexibility needed to deploy at short notice forces specifically tailored to 
a particular contingency.” (Cragg, 1996) 
However, owing to several frictions between the US and the European members fuelled by 
the  US’  objections  to  allowing  the  Europeans  access  to  crucial  NATO  assets,  the  1996  Berlin 
formula failed to achieve its aims. The path towards European security and defence architecture was 
paved  by  the  joint  communiqué  issued  in  1998  by  French  President  Chirac  and  British  Prime 
Minister Blair sped up by the crisis in Kosovo. Everything materialised at the Helsinki European 
Council from 1999 which launched the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and also 
initiated the Helsinki headline goals. Among these goals was the creation of a European Rapid 
Reaction Force (ERRF) of up to 60.000 troops which were to be deployed in the operations covered 
by the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping operations and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management and of peacemaking). (Wallace and Pollack, 2005, p. 449) 
By and large, ESDP is an intergovernmental policy based on consensus, where unanimity is 
required. According to Chivvis, “ESDP is best understood as a proven institutional capacity that 
allows  European  states  to  take  collective  action  to  conduct  small-scale  military  and  civilian 
operations  around  the  world,  if  they  choose,  without  help  from  NATO”.  (Chivvis,  2008,  p.  5) 
However, ESDP met with scepticism on the other side of the Atlantic. The Clinton administration 
expressed its concern that it might weaken NATO. In this regard, the US Secretary of State Albright 
through her famous 3 Ds formula expressed the US’ support to the project provided there was no 
decoupling  (the  ESDP  must  complement  to  NATO),  no  duplication  (of  the  NATO  command 
structures)  and  no  discrimination  (against  any  non-EU  NATO  member).  (Howorth  and  Keeler, 
2003, p. 11)  
In the following years, some EU members of a more Gaullist orientation wanted more EU 
decision-making  power  alleging  that  “the  withdrawal  of  the  Soviet  Union  from  Europe’s  East 
would naturally mean the withdrawal of the United States from Europe’s West” (Chivvis, 2008, p. 
10). In this sense, since 2003 when it took over the civilian police mission in Bosnia, ESDP has 
been engaged in several missions in FYROM, DR Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Sudan, Indonesia or in the 
Palestinian Territories. On the whole, the personnel involved in these missions performed a variety 
of  tasks,  from  law  enforcement  and  cease-fire  monitoring  to  security  and  humanitarian  crisis 
management. In spite of the circumstances, ERRF will not be able to carry out combat operations 
until, at earliest, 2012. (Cameron, 2007, pp. 82-83; ESDP’s operations website, 2008) C CE ES S   W Wo or rk ki in ng g   P Pa ap pe er rs s, ,   I II I, ,   ( (4 4) ), ,   2 20 01 10 0  56 
Unlike the Clinton administration, many officials who served under the Bush administration 
shared a win-win view of the ESDP. The European security was no longer seen as a peril to the 
harmony within NATO. “In the age of global terrorism, any capacity is welcome.” (Moens, 2003, p. 
35) Accordingly at the Bucharest Summit 2008, President Bush admitted that ESDP is both “useful 
and  necessary”  (Duff,  2008).  Moens  underlines  that  “there  is  more  concern  in  the  Bush 
administration  with  declining  European  defence  budgets  than  with  the  potential  of  an  ERRF 
competing with NATO” (Moens, 2003, pp. 34-35). Indeed, the  financing of the ESDP and the 
shares  in  the  budget  which  Europeans  confer  to  defence  casts  doubt  the  viability  of  ESDP, 
especially after the 9/11 since the US has been hasting the European governments to increase their 
defence spending and tackle the capabilities gap (members of NATO together spend only one third 
as much on defence as the USA). 
In June 2004, after making a re-evaluation of the activities fostered under ESDP’s framework, 
the EU acknowledged that many issues have to be improved. The new 2010 Headline Goals put 
emphasis  on  inter-operability,  deployability  and  sustainability.  Furthermore,  the  European  and 
Defence Agency (EDA) was established in order to enhance Europe’s defence capabilities, promote 
defence,  technology  and  armaments  cooperation,  and  create  a  competitive  European  defence 
equipment market. 
The years to come could contribute to ESDP’s further development as soon as the Lisbon 
Treaty will be ratified that could settle the intra-EU quarrel that previously obstructed ESDP’s 
evolution. Based on several analyses undertaken by many officials and experts in Brussels, Chivvis 
argues that the most possible scenario for the ESDP’s future is the one which embraces the so-
called Athenian model. This model in contrast to the soft, light Venusian pattern and the hawkish 
Ares model focuses either on creating capabilities for stabilisation and nation building operations or 
on building technological competence. Moreover, many experts claim that in order to accomplish 
its goals, ESDP must not only rely on the development of a  Euro-army, but also be part of a 
revitalised transatlantic security system. A positive U.S. attitude toward ESDP is practically the 
precondition for ESDP’s success. (Chivvis, 2008, p. 13) 
However, strains  still exist between the two sides. Five  years ago,  in 2003, the harmony 
within NATO was overshadowed by the conflict in Iraq when the new Europe - Britain, Italy, Spain 
and most of the CEECs – chose to follow the US leadership whereas old Europe – France and 
Germany – opposed to American grievances.  
One  major  U.S.  complaint  about  ESDP  is  that  it  creates  vis-à-vis  NATO  an  inherent 
competition  for  resources.  In  addition,  besides  the  early  American  concern  that  ESDP  would 
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present ESDP uses the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE) could aim according 
to the US’ perception “at building ESDP as an alternative to NATO” (Chivvis, 2008, pp. 28-31). 
Another rift has opened between some European states and the US who argue in favour of 
pushing NATO beyond its usual military tasks. One of the grounds behind NATO’s comprehensive 
security approach  launched at Riga  in 2006 underlines that today’s security threats  have to be 
tackled  with  a  more  civil-military  interface.  (Riga  Summit  Declaration,  2006)  This  could  be 
however difficult to attend by NATO for two reasons: firstly, the EU’s comparative advantage is 
exactly  its civilian power which  makes ESDP’s supporters reluctant to concede this domain to 
NATO and, secondly, because Turkey blocks every attempt on the side of NATO to solve the 
situation owing to its unclear status within this  new European security architecture. (Hofmann, 
2008, pp. 9-10) 
Turkey attempted to be part of the EU’s defence and security mechanism, but owing to its 
non-EU status its bid was rejected. The EU’s offer stated that Turkey cannot be part of the decision-
making of the EU, but may be involved in all aspects of the decision-shaping process. (Toffe 2003, 
p. 148) This is the reason why Turkey decided in spring 2000 to hinder the entire Berlin Plus 
mechanism by threatening to veto the transfer to the EU of the NATO assets. Therefore, in order to 
reach  a  final  agreement  on  Berlin-Plus,  “ESDP  de  facto  became  dependent  on  the  Turkish 
exception” (Haine, 2004, p. 139).  The Ankara text from 2001 represented an effort to thaw the 
strained situation. The document gave guarantees of non-aggression between NATO and ESDP and 
confirmed  that  ESDP  would  not  be  directed  against  non-EU  NATO  members.  Moreover,  at 
Turkey’s request, Cyprus was excluded from the EU-led military operations. The Ankara agreement 
gave thus the possibility to non-EU NATO members to be associated with decisions and take part, 
if they wish, in the EU’s missions. “The EU is ensuring the involvement of non-EU European 
members of NATO within ESDP” whereas NATO is giving the EU “assured access to its planning 
capabilities”( EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 2002). 
However,  a  disfunctional  problem  has  been  created  regarding  the  security  arrangements 
between NATO and the EU, which have been blocked by the Turkish-Cypriot dispute. The Cypriot 
government tries to exclude Turkey from European defence bodies, whereas Turkey precludes the 
participation  of  Cyprus  in  NATO-EU  meetings.  The  rapprochement  between  the  Cypriot  and 
Turkish sides needs urgently to be achieved because without a solution, Cyprus will hardly agree to 
Turkey’s  admission  into  the  EU,  which  could  complicate  even  more  the  cooperation  between 
NATO and ESDP. (Kambas, 2008) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the former Secretary General of NATO, 
suggested that the EU should extend its defence ties with Turkey to ease European cooperation with 
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move  which  could  persuade  Ankara  to  give  up  its  objections  towards  the  NATO-ESDP 
collaboration. (Hall, 2008) 
Despite  these  discrepancies  between  NATO  and  ESDP,  Victoria  Nuland,  the  former 
American  ambassador to  NATO,  emphasised  the  importance  of  ESDP  which  far  from  being  a 
threat, is currently an urgent necessity. “Europe needs, the US needs, NATO needs, the democratic 
world needs – a stronger, more capable European capacity.” (The Economist, 2008) In this sense, 
France has made the revitalisation of European defence a priority under its presidency of the EU: 
“Strengthening  European  defence  is  part  of  a  renewed  political  vision,  based  on  the 
complementarity of European and NATO defence.” (Jouyet, 2008)  
The importance of a European defence pillar in NATO is even stronger today, since Barack 
Obama was sworn into office on January 20, 2009. Daniel Hamilton, Director of the Center for 
Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, writes:  “President Obama’s  meetings  with 
NATO and EU leaders in April 2009 offered a rare opportunity to press the reset button on relations 
between Europe and North America. They must seize the moment to recast the Atlantic partnership 
− in all of its dimensions − to tackle a diverse range of challenges at home and abroad” (Hamilton, 
2009, 5). 
The NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kiel on April 3 and 4 2009 officially confirmed French 
return to NATO’s integrated military command more than 40 years after it left (in 1966). This move 
announced by President Sarkozy since June 2008 will try, according to analysts, to boost the EU 
defence dimension. (CNN, 2008) “The more France takes its place in NATO, the more European 
NATO becomes” (Duff, 2008), claimed the president.  
According to the Treaty of Lisbon which entered into force on the 1
st of December 2009, the 
ESDP was renamed to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Treaty of Lisbon has 
also brought about several innovations were to address the cohesion and effectiveness problem of 
the EU with respect to security and foreign affairs issues. 
On balance, it could be said that ESDP was, on the one hand, mostly the result of structural 
changes in the world political system brought about by the end of the Cold War and by several nidi 
of instability within Europe’s boundaries or at its periphery and, on the other hand, perhaps a need 
to counterbalance the US’ strength and capabilities. In a remarkable attempt to depict the future of 
ESDP  between  now  and  2020,  Keohane  and  Valasek  stress  three  things  which  ESDP  should 
accomplish  in  order  to  enhance  its  capabilities:  re-organise  and  improve  resources,  develop  a 
doctrine  for  comprehensive  crisis-management  and  invest  more  in  prevention.  (Keohane  and 
Valasek, 2008, 41-48) 
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